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A Look At Isolated
Wetlands Regulation
by Julia A. Olson"
I. Introduction
There is both political and legal disagreement over
which governmental entity, the federal government or the
states, should bear the responsibility for implementing envi-
ronmental protection laws. This conflict arises particularly
when environmental regulations appear intra-state in nature
(e.g., isolated wetlands regulation under the Clean Water
Act). Proponents of state regulation argue that the federal
government exceeds its power when it regulates intra-state
isolated wetlands. They also contend that states are in a bet-
ter position to know how to regulate environmental con-
cerns within their borders. Proponents of broad federal
power argue, on the other hand, that the Commerce Clause
is expansive enough to encompass this type of regulation
and that federal regulation will assure uniform protection
for those environmental issues that transcend state bor-
ders..
Recent Supreme Court decisions have heightened the
importance of this debate and its outcome. In Lopez v. United
States,' the Court returned regulatory powerto the states for
the first time in decades by invalidating a congressional
statute on the grounds that it had an insufficient nexus to
interstate commerce under Article I, section 8 of the
Constitution. If Lopez becomes the norm for scrutinizing con-
gressional commerce power, certain federal environmentat
laws, like those protecting isolated wetlands, might become
open to challenge on similar grounds.
The Court has also extended the regulatory takings doc-
trine, opening the door to more private property owners
seeking compensation from the government. In a series of
cases beginning with Nollan v. California Coastal Commission,
2
the Court expanded the doctrine by requiring compensation
for lost property value due to land use restrictions under
state law.
The combined legal effect of these two trends in the
Court's lurisprudence is potentially devastating to some
environmental protection statutes and regulations. While a
Lopez approach to environmental legislation would put
power over protecting the environment into states' hands,
the Nollan line of cases essentially forces these states into
deregulation or non-implementation due to the tremendous
costs of compensating private landowners. In this scenario,
states may have the power to promulgate regulations, but
would be powerless to implement them in light of this finan-
cial burden.
Therefore, in order to continue substantive legal protec-
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tion of vital national natural resources, it is impor-
tant for the Court to either isolate the effects of Lopez
or return to Justice Holmes' practical approach to
compensation under the Fifth Amendment, which
characterized the Court's approach throughout most
of this century: a balance between the ability of gov-
ernment to effectively regulate and the private
landowner's right to be compensated. 3 "Government
hardly could go on if to some extent values incident
to property could not be diminished without paying
for every such change in the general law."
4
This note will look first at the value of wetlands
and current federal regulatory schemes for their
protection. It will 'then analyze Lopez and the com-
merce power and undertake a regulatory takings
analysis in light of Nollan, Lucas, and Dolan. Finally, it
will evaluate the combined effects of these two con-
stitutional doctrines on isolated wetlands protec-
tion and examine what can be done to maintain the
current level of government intervention in the pro-
tection of these wetlands.
II. Background On Wetlands Regulation
"Wetlands are areas 'inundated or saturated
by surface or groundwater at a frequency and
duration sufficient to support, and that under
normal circumstances do support, a prevalence of
vegetation typically adapted for life in saturated
soil conditions." 5 They include swamps, marshes,
bogs and other similar types of land.6 Wetlands
3. In Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415
(1922). justice Holmes stated, "Itlhe general rule at least is, that
while property may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation
goes too far it will be recognized as a taking." Id.
4. Id. at 413.
5. Dennis I. Pnolo, Section 404 of the Clean Water Act: The
Case for Expansion of Federarjunsdiction Over Isolated Wetlands, 30 LAND
& WATER L. REV. 91, 92 (1995) (citing 33 C.ER. § 328.3 (b) (1993)
and 40 C.F.R. § 230.3(t) (1993)).
6. See id.
7; United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, 474 U.S.
121, 131 (1985).
8. Hoffman Homes, Inc. v. Administrator, 999 F2d 256,
263-64 (1993) (Manion, Circuit judge, concurring).
'-9. See Warren E. Leary, In Wetlands Debate, Acres and Dollars
Hinge on Definitions, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 15, 1991, at C4.
10. See id.
11. See Elizabeth Ann Glass Geltman, Regulation of Non-
Adjacent Wetlands under Section 404 of the Clean Water Act, 23 NEw
ENG. L. REv., 615-16 (1988-89).
12. See Paul Sarahan, Wetlands Protection Post-Lucas:
implications of the Public Trust Doctnne on Takings Analysis, 13 VA.
ENVrL. L. 1. 537. 538 (1994); William Reilly, Taking Aim Toward
2000; Rethinking the Nation's Environment Agenda, 21 ENVrL. L. 1359,
1362 (1991).
are typically put into two categories: adjacent
wetlands (wetlands directly connected or tidally
connected to a navigable body of water);7 and .iso-
lated wetlands (wetlands not located in or adja-
cent to a navigable or tidally affected body of
water).8 A common type of isolated wetland in
California and Oregon is a vernal pool with a
shallow depression that sporadically floods dur-
ing rainy periods but otherwise remains dry.9 A
second example in midwestern states is a prairie
pothole-a depression in the ground left by glac-
ier movements, which fills with either snowmelt
or rainfall. 10 Approximately 90 percent of remain-
ing wetlands are inland wetlands while the other
10 percent are coastal."
Only within the past twenty years have wet-
lands come to be appreciated for their ecological
and economic value.i2 In fact, prior to the 1970's,
the filling. and destruction of wetlands was an
encouraged policy of the United States and its
courts. 13 Wetlands were thought to be useless,
muddy, bacteria-infected nuisances to American
land. 14 People perceived direct profitability in con-
verting wetlands into agricultural, industrial or res-
idential usesY As a result of this ill-informed atti-
tude toward wetlands, more than 50 percent of wet-
lands in the lower 48 states have been destroyed.i
6
Even with today's increased awareness and laws to
protect the nation's remaining wetlands, they con-
tinue to disappear at a rate of nearly 300,000 acres
annuallyY Recent studies estimate that of the 215
13. in order to facilitate land development Congress
encouraged the draining and filling of wetlands without ever con-
sidenng the adverse environmental effects. Congress granted 65
million acres of wetlands to 15 western states for "swamp reclama-
tion" in the Swamp Lands Acts of 1849, 1850 and 1860. Wilu.IA L.
WAN, LAw OF WETLANDS REGULAION, § 2.02111 n.29 (1989).
14. The U.S. Supreme Court said wetlands were "the
cause of malarial and malignant fevers" and stated that "the
police power is never more legitimately exercised than in
removing such nuisances. Leovy v.United States, 177 U. S.
621,636 (1900).
15. See Michael C. Blumm & D. Bernard Zaleha, Federal
Wetlands Protection Under the Clean Water Act: Regulatory Ambivalence,
Intergovernmental Tension, and a Call for Reform, 60 U. COLO. L. REv.
695, 697 (1989).
16. "On average, this means that the lower 48 states have
lost over 60 acres of wetlands for every hour between the 1780's
and the 1980's California has lost the largestpercentage of
original wetlands within the state (91%). Florida has lost the
most acreage 19.3 million acres.)" T.E. DAHL, U.S. DEP'T. OF THE
INTERIOR, WETLANDS LOSSES IN THE UNITED STATES 1780's TO 1980's 5
(1991).
17. See T.E. DAHL AND C.E. JOHNSON, U.S. DEP'T. OF THE
INTERIOR, FISH AND WILDLIFE SERVICE, STATUS AND TRENDS OF
WETLANDS IN THE CONTERMINOUS UNITED STATES, MID-1970's TO MID-
1980's 1 (1991).
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million acres of continental wetlands in existence
during the colonial era, only 95 million acres
remain.18
The importance of wetlands conservation in
maintaining the health of animals (including
humans) and the environment is exemplified by
their numerous functions. Wetlands provide impor-
tant spawning, nesting, and feeding habitat for
many animals including migratory birds and one-
third of the nation's endangered species. 19 While so
many animal species are dependent on them for
survival, wetlands only make up five percent of the
nation's total land area. 20 Wetlands also act as a
natural flood control mechanism by collecting and
storing water runoff from adjacent land.21 For exam-
ple, prairie potholes store large amounts of storm
water runoff and prevent surface water runoff from
entering other bodies of water.22 Wetlands act as
natural sponges in the earth, with one acre-foot
holding about 360,000 gallons of water when flood-
ed.23 The tragedy of wetlands destruction with
respect to flood control was witnessed in the sum-
mer of 1993, with the flooding of over 16,000 square
miles of land in the Midwest. 24 Wetlands play an
essential role in regulating local hydrology, 25 in pro-
tecting water quality by filtering pollutants, sedi-
18. See RALPH W. TINER, U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR,
WETLANDS OF THE UNITED STATES: CURRENT STATUS AND RECENT
TRENDS 28-32 (1984).
19. See COUNCL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QuALxrY ANN. REP. 22, at 195
(1992); Linda Kanamine, Wetlands PolicyAppeases, Doesn't Please:
Conservation Effort includes Flood Control, USA TODAY, Aug. 25, 1993, at 6A.
20. See Stephen M. Johnson. Avoid, Minimize, Mitigate: The
Continuing Constitutionality Of Wetlands Mitigation After Dolan v. City of
Tigard, 6 FORDHAM ENvTL. LAW J. 689, 691 (1995).
21. See Kanamine. supra note 19. at 6A.
22. See Harold A. Kantrud, Gary L. Krapu, & George A.
Swanson, U.S. DEPT OF THE INTERIOR, PRAIRIE BASIN WETLANDS OF
THE DAKOTAS: A COMMUNITY PROFILE 65 (1989); D.E. Hubbard & R.L.
Linder, Spnng Runoff Retention in Praire Pothole Wetlands, 41 SOIL &
WATER CONS. 2:122-125 (1986). "One study of the Devil's Lake
basin in North Dakota found that prairie pothole wetlands store
40% of the runoff from a 100-year flood event - a large flood
that has a one percent probability of occumng in any given
year." Constance Hunt, Senior Program Officer, U.S. Land and
Wildlife Program World Wildlife Fund (editonal), U.S. Policies
Need a Flood of Reform, CHICAGO TRI., June 3, 1994, at 27N.
23. See Wetlands Regulation Reform Act of 1995: Heanngs on S.
851 The Regulatory Reform Act of 1995 Before the Subcommittee Clean
-Air, Wetlands, Private Property, and Nuclear Safety of the Senate
Committee on Environment and Public Works, 104th Cong. 1066
(1995) (statement of Jan Goldman-Carter, Counsel, National
Wildlife Federation).
24. See Jeffrey Fleishman and Dan Meyers, Wetland'
Destruction Costly for Midwest, HOUSTON CHRON., Aug. 8, 1993, at 6A;
Keith Schneider. After Flood, 2 Towns Diverge About the Next One. N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 7, 1992, 2, at 5; William K. Stevens, The High Risks of
Denying Rivers Their Flood Plains, N.Y. TIMES, July 20, 1993, at CI.
ments and excess nutrients out of the water,26 and
replenishing groundwater aquifers.27 Additionally,
wetlands help prevent erosion.
28
Each of these wetland functions provide an
economically valuable service. "The Fish and
Wildlife Service estimates that 55 million people
spent almost $10 billion in 1980 observing and pho-
tographing waterfowl and other wetland-dependent
species of birds."29 Conservative estimates for the
total recreational value of all wetlands in California
alone is estimated to be $160 million per year.30
There are other numerous examples of wetland
functions, such as providing lobs and services that
we would otherwise have to produce artificially (e.g.
cleansing our water supplies).
Based on the obvious ecological and economic
value of wetlands and the present trend to protect
those remaining from further degradation, it is sig-
nificant to note that according to some estimates,
75 percent of wetlands in the lower 48 contiguous
states are privately ownedYi The effect of this allo-
cation is that any law protecting wetlands will
directly impact the rights of private land owners.
Intuitively, this results in increased conflict and dif-
ficulty in implementing protective mechanisms.
The primary protective mechanism for wet-
25. See. e.g., 1. HENRY SATHER & R. DANIE SMITH, U.S. DEP'T.
OF THE INTERIOR, AN OVERVIEW OF MAIOR WETLAND FUNCTIONS AND
VALUES 3-7 (1984); M. T. BROWN & M.F SULLIVAN. THE VALUE OF
WETLANDS IN Low RELIEF LANDSCAPES, IN THE ECOLOGY AND
MANAGEMENT OF WETLANDS 133-45 (D. Hooked.. 1988); Michael R.
Deland, No Net Loss of Wetlands: A Comprehensive Approach, 7 NAT.
RESOURCES & ENV'T. 3.
26. See Stephen M. Johnson, Federal Regulation of Isolated
Wetlands, 23 ENVTL. L. 1. 2-3. 30 (1993) (citing HAROLD A. KANTRUD,
GARY L. KRAPu, & GEORGE A. SWANSON, U.S. DEP'T. OF THE INTERIOR,
PRAIRIE BASIN WETLANDS OF THE DAKOTAS: A COMMUNITY PROFILE 66-
67 (1989)): Linda A. Malone, The Coastal Zone Management Act and
the Takings Clause in the 1990's: Making the Case for Federal Land Use
to Preserve Coastal Areas, 62 U. CoLo; L. REV. 711,712 (1991); M.T.
BROWN & M.Y SULLIVAN, THE VALUE OF WETLANDS IN LOW RELIEF
LANDSCAPES, IN THE ECOLOGY AND MANAGEMENT OF WETLANDS 133-45
(Donald D. Hooked., 1988).
27. See WILLIAM A. NIERING, THE AUDUBON SociETY NATURE
GUIDES, WETLANDS 31 (1989).
28. See Kanamme, supra note 19.
29. Wetlands: Hearngs on S. 851, supra note 23.
30. See Prepared testimony of Jan Goldman-Carter Counsel
Representing National Wildlife Federation Prepared By: Jan Goldman-
Carter Counsel Representing National Wildlife Federation, Grady McCallie,
Wetlands Legislative Representative, Fish and Wildlife Resources Division.
National Wildlife Federation, Before the Senate Environmental and Public
Works Committee, Federal News Service, August 2. 1995.
31. See Position Statement: Written Statement of thg National
Association of State Departments of Agnculture Submitted to the
Environment and Public Works Subcommittee on Clean Water, Fisheries,
and Wildlife, United States Senate Re: Federal.Wetlands Protection.
Federal News Service, Sept. 15, 1993.
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lands is the federally enacted Clean, Water Act
(CWA). 32 Congress enacted the CWA in 1972 in
order to protect the health of the nation's waters.
Section 404 of the CWA prohibits discharging
dredged or fill materials into the "waters" of the
United States without an Army Corps of Engineers
(Corps) permit.33 The term "waters" in the CWA
has been interpreted broadly by the regulatory
agencies in charge of its promulgation, 34 as well as
the courts. 35 "Waters" has been defined as any
body of water reachable under the Commerce
Clause.36 Although the statute does not explicitly
include wetlands in its definitions, the Corps and
the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) assert
jurisdiction over wetlands, including isolated wet-
-lands, the "use, degradation or destruction of
which could affect interstate or foreign com-
merce."37 Thus, the Corps and EPA regulate isolat-
ed wetlands if they have a "site-specific impact on
interstate commerce," but they may regulate any
adjacent wetland without further restrictions.
38
Isolated wetlands are defined as those wetlands,
intra-state in nature, that when used-or damaged
could have an impact on interstate commerce. 39
Since there is a stronger argument for regulating
adjacent wetlands as part of the "waters of the
United States" under the CWA, this paper will
focus primarily on isolated wetlands and the gov-
ernment's ability to protect them in a battle
against the courts' narrow interpretations.
32. 33 U.S.C. § 125 1(a) (1997).
33. See id. Congress intended to "restore and maintain
the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation's
waters. Id.
34. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the Army
Corps of Engineers (Corps) are the two administrative agencies
responsible for wetlands regulation.
35. See United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, 474
U.S. 121. 133 (1985) (held Congress intended to regulate waters
which might not meet the traditional test of "navigability");
Leslie Salt Co. v. Froehlke, 403 F. Supp. 1292, 1296-97 (N.D. Cal.
1974) (held the term "navigable waters" to include the broadest
possible commerce clause interpretation), rev'd on other
grounds, 578 F.2d 742 (9th Cir..1978).
But see Hoffman Homes, Inc. v. Environmental Protection
Agency, 999 F.2d 256, 262-63 (7th Cir. 1993) (Maniort, I., concur-
ring) (found Congress did not intend to reach isolated wetlands
under the Clean Water Act and "isolated wetlands by definition
have no effect on the waters of the United States").
The legislative history of the Clean Water Act shows
Congress intended "navigable waters" to be given the broadest
meaning constitutionally possible. H.R. Rep. No. 911, 92d
Cong., 2d Sess. 131 (1972); S. Conf. Rep. No. 1236, 92d Cong.,
2d Sess. 144 (1972) reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3776. 3822.
36. See Riverside Bayview Homes, 474 U.S. at 133.
III. Commerce Clause Analysis In Light Of Lopez
v. United States
The United States Constitution provides
Congress with a list of enumerated powers.4 0 The
Supreme Court has interpreted these powers as
limiting the power that the federal government can
exercise.41 The Commerce Clause, as one of the
enumerated powers, allows Congress to regulate
interstate and foreign commerce. 42 Over time,
Congress expanded its use of the Commerce
Clause, and it is now among the most common
bases for Congress' exercise of power.
Consequently, since 1937 the Court has also
defined "interstate commerce" very broadly in
upholding Congressional legislation.
Before 1937 the Court drew categorical distinc-
tions between intrastate activity and interstate
activity, or direct and indirect effects on interstate
commerce. Post-1937 Supreme Court decisions
consider the gray areas of "affecting interstate com-
merce," and do away with black and white cate-
gories for distinguishing valid uses of the commerce
power from invalid, over-expansive uses.4 3 Wickard v.
Filburn was a critical case in the commerce power
evolution. There, the Court held that "even if Ithel
activity be local and though it may not be regarded
as commerce, it may still, whatever its nature, be
reached by Congress if it exerts a substantial eco-
nomic effect on interstate commerce."44 The Court
also determined that the proper category of analy-
sis is the application of the law to all people simi-
37. 33 C.F.R. § 328.3 (1997). The Corps regulations state
in part:
(3) All other waters such as intrastate lakes, rivers,
streams (including intermittent streams), mudflats, sand-
flats, wetlands, sloughs, prairie potholes, wet meadow,
playa lakes, or natural ponds, the use, degradation or
destruction of which could affect interstate or foreign com-
merce including any such waters:
(i) Which are or could be used by interstate or foreign
travelers for recreational or other purposes; or
(ii) From which fish or shellfish are or could be taken
and sold in interstate or foreign commerce; or
(iii) Which are used or could be used for industnal
purpose by industries in interstate commerce. Id.
38. Priolo, supra note 5, at 93 n. 12 (citing 33 C.F.R. section
328.3 (a), (c) (1993)).
39. See 40 C.F.R. § 230.3. subpart A (s) (3) (1996).
40. U.S. CONsr. art. I, sec. 8, ds. 1-18.
41. See Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 457 (1991).
42. "The Congress shall have Power Itol regulate
Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States,
and wi'th the Indian Tribes. U.S. CONST., art. I, sec 8, cl. 2.
43. See317U.S. 111, 124 (1942).
44. Id. at 125.
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larly situated and not lust to the individual plain-
tiff.4 5 In other words, although the law's application
to one person might not substantially affect inter-
state commerce, if all similarly situated people
taken together create a substantial impact,,the law
is within federal regulatory jurisdiction.4 6 This is
now known as the "cumulative effect" test.
Today, when Congress legislates under the aus-
pices of the Commerce Clause there are three
potential scenarios with which the courts are faced.
First, Congress might pass a law with an explicit
finding that the regulated activity affects interstate
commerce. 47 Both Hodel v. Virginia48 and Hodel v.
Indiana49 illustrate this type of legislation and
demonstrate the broad reach of the commerce
power. Upon a challenge to the Surface Mining Act
of 1977 in Hodel v. Virginia, Justice Marshall held that
the Court must defer to federal findings of an effect
on interstate commerce by applying a "rational
basis" standard of review to determine the constitu-
tionality of the law.'0 The Court further held the leg-
islative finding to be rational and adequately sup-
ported by the legislative record." Although the
Court in Hodel v. Indiana disagreed with the substan-
tiality of the effect on interstate commerce, it
deferred to Congress' explicit finding of a substan-
tial effect in order to avoid substituting its own find-
ings for those of Congress.' 2 Second, Congress may
implicitly exercise its complete Commerce Clause
power.' 3 The final type of case raising commerce
power concerns is where Congress makes no refer-
ence to the Commerce Clause but the legislation
itself raises the issue. This was the case in Lopez v.
United States.'
4
During its 1995 term, the Supreme Court threw
a wrench into nearly 70 years of Commerce Clause
jurisprudence by invalidating a congressional
statute in Lopez. 5 Lopez involved a challenge to the
45. See id. at 127-28.
46. See id.
47. See Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation
Ass'n, Inc., 452 U.S. 264, 276 (1981 ); see also Hodel v. Indiana, 452
U.S. 314 (1981).
48. See 452 U.S. at 276 ('The court must defer to a con-
gressional finding that a regulated activity affects interstate
commerce if there is any rational basis for such a finding")
49. See 452 U.S. 314.
50. 452 U.S. at 276 (citing Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United
States, 379 U.S. 241, 258 (1964); Katzenbach v. McClung, 379
U.S. 294 (1964)). The rational basis standard of review is the
most deferential standard applied by the Court and simply
requires the legislation to be rationally related to a legitimate
purpose. See KENNETH L. KARST. STANDARD OF REVIEW, IN 4
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 1720-21 (Leonard W.
Levy et al., eds., 1986).
federal Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990 (Act)
which prohibited the "knowing possession of a
firearm in a school zone."56 Lopez argued that the
Act was beyond the legislative power of Congress as
enumerated in the Constitution.'7 The Court
agreed, holding that the Act neither regulated a
commercial activity nor met the substantial relation
to interstate commerce requirement.' 8 The Court
rejected the government's argument that posses-
sion of a firearm eventually affects the national
economy and stated that under such "national pro-
ductivity reasoning" Congress could regulate virtu-
ally any activity related to the economic productivi-
ty of individual citizens. 59 The Court acknowledged
its deferential approach to reviewing formal and
even informal findings of Congress, but held that
there was no rational basis for upholding the legis-
lation, since no findings were made in support of a
substantial connection to interstate commerce.
60
The Court's stricter requirement that the regulated
activity substantially affects interstate commerce
subjects federal statutes to review under a tough-
ened rational basis standard.
61
It is highly likely that Lopez will have a deleteri-
ous effect on a Commerce Clause analysis regarding
the regulation. of isolated wetlands under the CWA.
In a dissenting opinion to the denial of a writ of cer-
tiorari in the case of Cargill, Inc. v. United States,
Justice Thomas stated that "the basis asserted to
create federal jurisdiction over petitioners land in
this case seems to me to be even. more far-fetched
than that offered and rejected in Lopez."62 Justice
Thomas was eager to decide whether the potential
or occasional existence of migratory birds on isolat-
ed wetlands created a sufficient nexus with inter-
state commerce to permit regulation.63 It is clear
from his opinion that Justice Thomas finds the
Corps' expansive interpretation of its regulatory
51. See Hodel v. Virginia, 452 U.S. at 277-80.
52. Hodel v. Indiana. 452 U.S. at 325-26.
53. See Russell v. United States, 471 U.S. 858, 859 (1985)
(citing Scarborough v. United States, 431 U.S. 563, 571 (1977)).
54. 514 U.S. at 559-63.
55. Id. at 567.
56. 18 U.S.C. § 922 (q) (1994).
57. See Lopez. 514 U.S. at 563.
58. See id. at 567.
59. Id. at 563.
60. See id. at 561-563.
61. See Deborah ]ones Merritt. COMMERCE. 94 MICH. L.
REv. 674. 678-79 (1995).
62. 516 U.S. 955 (1995).
63. See id.
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powers to be a long stretch from Congress' true
Commerce Clause powers as set forth in Lopez.
64
"The specific issue of whether the Corps has
CWA jurisdiction over isolated wetlands has yet to
reach the U.S. Supreme Court."65 The Supreme Court
recognized the Corps' authority under section 404 of
the CWA to regulate adjacent wetlands, but express-
ly refused to decide the issue of isolated wetlands in
the case of United States v. Riverside-Bayvtew Homes.66 In
Riverside-Bayvew Homes, the Court relied on Congress'
intent to have a "broad .systemic view of the goal of
maintaining and improving water quality" and the
broad federal power necessary to achieve this goal.67
The Court considered the legislative history sur-
rounding the CWA determinative of the fact that
Congress intended to implement a broad interpreta-
tion of the phrase "waters of the United States."68
Other courts have addressed the related issue
of federal regulation of other isolated, intra-state
bodies of water under the Commerce Clause. 69 Utah
v. Marsh was one of the first cases deciding whether
the Commerce Clause reached these intra-state
bodies of water.70 The Court of Appeals held the
water could be reached through the Commerce
Clause because: 1) interstate travelers sometimes
used the lake in question; 2) the lake supported a
commercial fishery selling its products out-of-state;
3) the lake provided water to irrigate crops sold in
the national market; and 4) the water was frequent-
ed by migratory birds.71 Two other federal cases also
found the commerce power broad enough to
encompass regulation of intra-state waters.
72
The first federal case to deal specifically with
the commerce power's relation to the regulation of
isolated wetlands was Leslie Salt Co. v. United States.
73
Petitioner owned land southeast of San Francisco
64. See id. at 408-09.
65. Pnolo, supra note 5, at 95.
66. 474 U.S. at 131 n.8.
67. Id. at 132.
68. In the 1972 CWA Amendments, Congress rejected the
1899 River and Harbors Act's narrow interpretation of "navigable
waters." See Riversrde-Bayview Homes, 474 U.S. at 133 (citing S. REP.
No. 92-1236 at 144 (1972), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.CA.N. 3776,
3822).
69. John A. Leman, The Birds: Regulation of Isolated wetlands
and the Limits of the Commerce Clause, 28 U.C. DAvis L. REv. 1237,
1255 n.I I (1995).
70. 740 F.2d 799 (loth Cir. 1984).
71. See id. at 803-04.
72. See Residents Against Industnal Landfill Expansion v.
Diversified Systems, Inc., 804 F. Supp. 1036, 1039 (E.D. Tenn.
1992) (two intrastate creeks used to provide water to livestock
were held to be within the reach of the Commerce Clause and
which included 12.5 acres of isolated wetlands used
as habitat by 55 species of migratory birds.74 The
court held that "the commerce clause power, and
thus the Clean Water Act, is broad enough to extend
the Corps' jurisdiction to local waters which may
provide habitat to migratory birds and endangered
species."75 The court found the legislative history of
the CWA supportive of the Corps action based on
"Congress' intent to extend Act jurisdiction over
waters of the United States to the maximum extent
possible under the Commerce Clause."76 Further,
the court relied on United States v. Riverside Bayview
Homes, Inc. to support the Corps' interpretation of
the statute by recognizing similarities between
adjacent wetlands and isolated wetlands. 77 The
court also quoted the following reasoning from
Palila v. Hawaii Department of Land and Natural Resources
for upholding the Endangered Species Act against a
Commerce Clause challenge: "a national program to
protect and improve the natural habitats of endan-
gered species preserves the possibilities of inter-
state commerce in these species and of interstate
movement of persons, such as amateur students of
nature or professional scientists who come to a
state to observe and study these species."78
Although the court in Leslie Salt upheld the reg-
ulations as a valid exercise of the commerce power,
it did express some reservations about the reason-
ableness of the migratory bird nexus when there is
no evidence of human contact with the seasonally
ponded wetlands. 79 In light of Lopez, this explicit
concern by some courts places wetlands regulation
on unstable ground. However, this reservation
should be -dispelled by taking a closer look at the
argument in Palila. The key phrase in the Palila
court's holding is its emphasis that, by improving
the CWA because they might affect interstate commerce to
some extent); see also United States v. Earth Sciences, Inc., 599
F.2d 368, 374-75 (loth Cir. 1979) (people's use of an intrastate
stream's water to irngate crops sold in interstate commerce is a
substantial enough connection to justify regulation by the fed-
eral government).
73. 896 F.2d 354 (9th Cir. 1990); see also Leslie Salt Co. v.
United States 5 F.3d 1388 (9th Cir. 1995). See also Cargill, Inc. v.
United States 516 U.S. 955. 956 (1995).
74. See Leslie Salt Co., 55 E3d at 1390-91.
75. Leslie Salt Co., 896 F.2d at 360 (citing Utah v. Marsh, 740
F.2d 799, 804 (loth Cir. 1984)).
76. Leslie Salt Co., 55 3d at 1395 (citing S. RP. No. 92-
1236 at 144 (1972), repnnted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3668, 3776).
77. See id.
78., Id. at 1396 (quoting Palila v. Hawaii Department of
Land and Natural Resources, 471 ESupp. 985, 995 (D. Haw.
1979), affd, 639 F.2d 495 (9th Cir. 1981)).
79. Id. at 1396.
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the natural habitats of endangered species and
migratory birds, the government is preserving the
possibilities of interstate commerce in these species along
with th& movement of persons.80 The key distinction in
the Palia court's analysis is that commerce relating
to these species does not have to take place on
petitioner's land in order to create the nexus with
interstate commerce. The nexus is instead created
by the fact that more birds will come to California,
Oregon and Washington and be available for bird-
watching or hunting as a result of preserving avail-
able habitat within these states. It would be an
entirely different story if the birds themselves were
permanently isolated on the Leslie Salt land and
never became subjects of interstate commerce, but
this is not the case since the nature of the birds is
"migratory."
Hoffman Homes Inc. v. EPA is another federal case
holding that the Corps has legitimate power to regu-
late isolated wetlands where there is some site-spe-
cific connection to interstate commerce.81 However,
the Hoffman Homes court still entered ludgment in
favor of Hoffman Homes Inc. because it found that
the EPA failed to demonstrate substantial evidence
that birds could potentially use the isolated wetlands
in question.82 The court established a difficult stan-
dard to meet due to its lack of clarity in defining the
standard. It seems to require more proof of a migra-
tory bird presence than it intimates.83
Presently, the Corps asserts lurisdiction over
isolated wetlands when: (1) the wetlands are used
or can potentially be used by migratory birds which
cross state lines;84 (2) the wetlands are used or can
potentially be used by migratory birds protected by
migratory bird treaties;85 (3) the wetlands are used
by endangered species;86 (4) the wetlands prevent
flooding;87 (5) the wetlands protect interstate
waters against pollution;88 and (6) the wetlands are
used for recreational purposes by interstate travel-
ers.8 9 Since none of these specific attempts to
establish a nexus between isolated wetlands regu-
lation and a substantial effect on interstate com-
merce has been decided by the Supreme Court,
80. Palila v. Hawaii Department of Land and Natural
Resources, 471 E Supp. 985, 995 (D. Haw. 1979), affd, 639 F.2d
495 (9th Cir. 1981) (emphasis added).
81. 999 F.2d 248, 261 (7th Cir. 1993).
82. Id. at 262. Some argue that the EPA presented sub-
stantial evidence, and that the Court erred in applying too heavy
a burden. See Pnolo, supra note 5, at 97, 98.
83. See Pnolo, supra note 5, at i00 (the Seventh Circuit
requires more than a general statement by an agency expert that
an isolated wetland is a suitable habitat for migratory birds).
84. See Leslie Salt Co. 55 F.3d at 1394-95.
85. 51 Fed. Reg. 41,206, 41,217 (1987).
there are inconsistencies with their application in
different federal districts. Although the courts typi-
cally can find a "site-specific" connection to inter-
state commerce, there are many isolated wetlands
lacking this connection. As a result, they are con-
sidered outside of the zone of regulation.90
In order to guarantee broad, effective regula-
tion over isolated wetlands, the Corps should argue
for application of the cumulative effects test as
established in Wickard v. Filburn.91 Under this doc-
trine each isolated wetland alone would not need a
site-specific substantial effect on interstate com-
merce because the test would be whether all wet-
lands similarly situated and regulated, if taken
together, would have a substantial impact on inter-
state commerce.
However, since Lopez has initiated a return to
pre-1937 notions of the commerce power and has
created a narrower interpretation of "substantially
affects interstate commerce," the nexus between reg-
ulation of isolated wetlands and the Commerce
Clause will be difficult to establish. Although Justice
Rehnquist stated the Court was not overturning any
precedent, such asWickard v. Filburn, it fundamentally
reinvented the meaning and application of this case,
and others, by demanding the regulated intrastate
activity be some sort of economic enterprise. It is
clear an inferential argument will do little to convince
this malority that the activities regulated "arise out of
or are connected with a commercial transaction."
Without meeting this "economic enterprise" require-
ment, the "cumulative effect" doctrine is out of reach.
If and when the Supreme Court decides to grant cer-
tiorari to decide the legitimacy of these regulations
under the Commerce Clause, it will impact federal
protection of some very important natural resources.
IV. Analysis Of The New Regulatory Takings
Doctrine
The Fifth Amendment's lust compensation
clause provides "nor shall private property be taken
for public use, without lust compensation."92 Inverse
86. See Palila v. Hawaii Dep't. of Land & Natural
Resources, 471 F. Supp. 985, 994-95 (D.,Haw. 1979).
87. See Oklahoma v. Atkinson Co., 3 i 3 U.S. 508, 525
(1941).
88. See United States v. Ashland Oil & Transportation Co.,
504 F.2d. 1317, 1328 (6th Cir. 1974).
89. See United States v. Earth Sciences, Inc., 599 F.2d. 368,
375 (10th Cir. 1979).
90. Cf. Pnolo. supra note 65, at ioo.
91. 317U.S. at 127-28.
92. U.S. CoNsT. amend. V.
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condemnation, a government regulation which
results in a taking without formal condemnation pro-
ceedings, occurs when the government either physi-
cally occupies private property,9 3 or "takes" property
purely through regulatory means.9 4 The landmark
regulatory takings case, written by Justice Holmes,
held that "if regulation goes too far it will be recognized
as a taking."95 For decades the Court has struggled
with trying to define when government regulation of
private property "goes too far" and becomes a taking
under the 5th Amendment.
Since the Lochner era of substantive review of
economic regulations ended, courts generally
have given broad deference to the legitimacy of
state regulation, even over private property inter-
ests. The fundamental two-prong test to ascertain
whether a regulation effectuates a taking is: (1)
does the regulation of the property substantially
advance a legitimate state interest, and (2) does
the regulation deny the owner an economically
viable use of his/her property'?96 If "yes" is the
answer to either prong, there might be a com-
pensable regulatory taking.
In Nollan v. California Coastal Comnussion,9 7 the
Court departed from its traditional, lenient review
of state land regulation in order'to find a compens-
able taking. The Nollans sought a permit from
California to rebuild their house on a beachfront lot
in Ventura County.98 The California Coastal
Commission (Commission) determined that the
new house would be a "psychological hindrance" to
the public by blocking visual access to the beach,
effectively deterring the public from using the
beaches.99 The Commission granted the Nollans'
permit but conditioned it upon the establishment
of a public easement across their beachfront prop-
erty where it paralleled the beachOO The
Commission hoped to offset the burden on the pub-
lic's ability to use the shorefront by providing a
walkway in front of the Nollans' home with lateral
access to the beaches on either side. Although the
lower courts had found the permit condition did not
deprive the Nollans of all reasonable use of their
93. See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp.,
458 U.S, 419, 421 (1982) (physical occupation of pnvate property
with cable television hookup is considered to be a taking).
94. Mark A. Chertok. Federal Regulation of Wetlands. C127
ALI-ABA 1131. 1166-67 (1995).
95. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415
(1922) (emphasis added).
96. See, e.g., Nollan v. California Coastal Commission, 483
U.S. 825, 834 (1987); Agins v. City of'iburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260
(1980).
97. 483 U.S. 825 (1987)
98. See id. at 827.
property, and only partially diminished the value of
their lot, the Supreme Court held that the condition
amounted to a taking under the Fifth Amend-
ment.101
Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, found
that this particular land use regulation did not meet
the long-recognized requirements that-are neces-
sary'to prevent a taking, 02 including "substantially
advanc[ingl legitimate state interests," and not
"den[ying] an owner economically viable use of his
land." 10 3 He reasoned that the essential nexus did
not exist because the condition of the easement did
not further the end advanced by the Commission.1
04
However, as Justice Brennan illustrated in his dis-
sent, the Commission was trying to "offset (the
encroachment on public access by the Nollan's new
home) by obtaining an assurance that the public
may walk along the shoreline in order to gain access
to the ocean." 0 5 The dissent also criticized the
majority's high level of scrutiny of the State's exer-
cise of its police power.i 6 Traditionally, the Court
had only determined whether the means are "ratio-
nally related" or "reasonably necessary" to accom-
plish the ends.i07
Justice Scalia engages in judicial arrogation of
legislative authority when he invalidates legislative
decisions not found to be clearly arbitrary and
unreasonable. Justice Brennan expounds on the
potential effects of Scalia's opinion when he states
in his dissent, "the Court's use of an unreasonably
demanding standard for determining the rationality
of state regulation in this area thus could hamper
innovative efforts to preserve an increasingly fragile
national resource." 108
Property does not exist in isolation.
Particular parcels are tied to one another in
complex ways, and property is more accu-
rately described as being inextricably part
of a network of relationships that is neither
limited to, nor usefully defined by, the
property boundaries with which the legal
system is accustomed to dealing.
99. See id.
100. See id.
101. Seeid. at 830-31.
102. See id. at 837.
103. Agins v. City ofTiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980).
104. See Nollan, 483 U.S. at 838.
105. Id. at 842, 845 (Brennan. I., dissenting).
106. See id. at 843-,45 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
107. See id.
108. Id. at 848 (Brennan, I., dissenting).
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Frequently, use of any given parcel of prop-
erty is at the same time effectively a use of,
or a demand upon, property beyond the
border of the user.3 9
The Nollan majority rejected the California Coastal
Commission's efforts to deal with these complex
relationships surrounding property and instead
substituted its own judgment.
The Court did not stop with Nollan. It contin-
ued to expand the application of regulatory takings
in requiring compensation for private fandowners
affected by actions of the state police power. Lucas
v. South Carolina Coastal Council," 0 also written by
Justice Scalia, was the next significant decision.
South Carolina's legislature enacted the Coastal
Zone Management Act and the Beachfront
Management Act in order to protect "critical areas"
along the coast from destruction.III The latter Act
prevented Lucas from building two single family
homes on property he owned along South
Carolina's coast due to instability of the land.ii
2
Scalia outlined two categorical tests for determin-
ing whether there had been a taking: (1) any phys-
ical occupations are takings; and (2) if the taking
would deprive the owner of full value of his/her
property, then full compensation is necessary.in 3
However, the Court also established exceptions to
these general applications. First, if a regulation
prohibits uses of property that were not previous-
ly permissible under relevant property laws and
nuisance principles of the common law then there
is no taking.'1 4 Secondly, there is no taking if there
is not total value loss, and the regulation substan-
tially advances a legitimate government inter-
est.i15
This second exception is the "ad hoc taking
test," used when there is no "categorical taking."' 16
The test generally involves a balancing approach,
exemplified by the Court in Penn Central v. Mahon,
where courts assess the character of the govern-
mental regulation, the economic impact, and the
109. Id. at 863-64 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Joseph
Sax, Takings, Private Property, and Public Rights, 81 YALE L.J. 149, 152
(1971)).
110. 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
11I. See id. at 1009.
112. See Id.
113. Seeid. at 1015.
14. See id. at 1022-1032.
115. See id. at 1O16.
116. id. at 1052
117. See Chertok, supra note 94, at 1176.
owner's reasonable investment-backed expecta-
tions to determine whether a taking has
occurred.' 17 Generally, wetlands cases will focus on
the two latter elements because courts will often
find a sufficient nexus between wetlands regula-
tion and the legitimate end sought by the regula-
tor.ni 8 However, when isolated wetlands are at
issue, there will likely be more focus on the char-
acter of the governmental regulation because of
doubts about the true ecological significance of
isolated wetlands.
There are several problems with justice
Scalia's test. One problem is that the Court fails to
identify what the "nuisance at common law" excep-
tion covers. The exception could be applied literal-
ly, requiring an identical nuisance that is recog-
nized at common law. However, if analogizing is
appropriate for establishing a nuisance, then most
harms today might be compared to a nuisance in
the 19th century. Although Justice Scalia clearly
endorses the use of analogies to common law nui-
sances,i 9 he tempers the use of the exception by
requiring that-the regulation reflect limitations "in
the title itself, land] in the restrictions that back-
ground principles of the state's law of property and
nuisance already place upon land ownership" at
the time of purchase. 120 "Thus, it appears that a
state legislature cannot insulate the government
from a successful taking claim by 'finding' that the
regulated activity constituted a 'nuisance"'
because there would have had to be an expecta-
tion that the activity in question would be prohib-
ited under state property and nuisance laws. 121
The most significant problem with the malori-
ty opinion is how the Court defines and evaluates
the property interest. Compensation under this
decision hinges on how one defines the property
interest and whether or not "all value" has been
taken. Ultimately the test seems to be a subjective
one. Here, the Court found that all of Lucas' prop-
erty value was "taken" by the regulation and
required full compensation.122 However, even
118. See id. at 1176-77.
119. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1028. Justice Scalia gives two
examples where compensation would be denied because the
uses, although productive, would not have been permissible
under relevant property and nuisance laws. A lake owner can't
gain a permit to drain his lake if it would cause flooding on
other people's property and an owner of a nuclear plant can be
required to "remove" all improvements from its land upon dis-
covery that the plant sits astride an earthquake fault. Id.
120. Id. at 1029.
121. Chertok, supra note 94, at 1175.
122. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1018.
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though Lucas was prohibited from building the
two houses, he was not prevented from using his
property in other ways. For instance, some critics
argue he could pitch a tent on the land or live in a
movable trailer and still have.full enjoyment of the
ocean-front property. 23 He could' also sell the
land. Scalia diminishes the /intrinsic value of
nature, and land itself, by assuming that leaving
land "substantially in its natural state" deprives
the owner of all economically beneficial or produc-
tive use of his/her land.
124
Lucas also left unresolved the issue of whethe
the takings test must be applied to the parcel as a
whole-.or if some lesser entity, such as the affected
area only, can be used. "It is well-settled that a mere
diminution in value does not, without more, consti-
tute a taking." 25 Thus, it is particularly important in
wetlands cases to determine whether the whole
parcel is the applicable unit for analysis, since most
wetlands regulations only affect a portion of the
owner's land, leaving much of the land unregulat-
ed. 126 If the Court allows the wetland portion to be
isolated for the takings analysis, chances for com-
pensation are greatly increased under both the cat-
egorical test and/or the ad hoc balancing ap-
proach.i 27
The issue seemed well-settled by cases such as
Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New Yorki28 and
Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis,
129
explaining that the inquiry was into the whole par-
cel, not just the affected portion.
Taking jurisprudence does not divide a sin-
gle parcel into discrete segments and
attempt to determine whether rights in a
particular segment- have been entirely
abrogated. In deciding whether a particular
government action has effected a taking,
the Court focuses rather both on the char-
acter of the action and on the nature of the
interference with rights in the parcel as a
123. See id. at 1044 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (finding that
all economic value has been taken is erroneous because Lucas
still possesses rights in the bundle of rights, such as the right to
exclude others and use his property).
124. See id. at 1018.
125. Chertok, supra note 94, at 1172 (citing Penn Central
Transportation Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978)).
126. See id.
127. See id.
128. 438 U.S. 104, 130-31 (1978) (the air space above the
station was not'considered independently from the entire prop-
erty in the takings analysis. The Court found no compensable
taking had occurred).
129. 480 U.S. 470, 500 (1987) (the Court did not consider
whole. 130
However, Justice Scalia brought the issue into quest
tion with footnote seven to his majority opinion in
Lucas.
Regrettably, the rhetorical force of our
"deprivation of all economically feasible
use" rule is greater than its precision, since
the rule does not make clear the "property
interest" against which the loss of value is
to be measured. When, for example, a reg-
ulation requires a developer to leave 90%
of a rural tract in its natural state, it is
unclear whether we would analyze the situ-
ation as one in which the owner has been
deprived of all economically beneficial use
of the burdened portion of the tract, or as
one in which the owner has suffered a mere
diminution in value of the tract as a whole.
In any event, we avoid this difficulty in
the present case, since the "interest in
land" that Lucas has pleaded Iis one recog-
nized at the common lawl.i 3i
This issue was not only well-settled before Lucas,
but it was extraneous to the case since the size of
the property was not in question. 32 It is curious
that Justice Scalia even brought up the issue; yet,
the consequences of his doing so are exemplified by
recent decisions of the federal circuit courts.
Although a number of alleged takings cases regard-
ing wetlands have addressed this issue and
resolved that the whole parcel should be the unit of
analysis,133 some recent post-Lucas Federal Court of
Claims decisions are quite unsettling.
Loveladies Harbor v. United States was the first wet-
lands-taking case to hold that the relevant parcel for
defining whether there is a regulatory taking is the
affected parcel, not the entire holding of land.
34
The size of the property affected by the permit
an underground, coal, estate support independently from the
rest of the company's coal reserves for determining the lost
value in a takings analysis).
130. Penn Central,,438 U.S. at 130-31 (emphasis added).
131. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1016.
132. See Michael C. Blumm, The End of Environmental Law?
Libertarian Property, Natural Law, and The Just Compensation Clause in
the Federal Circuit, 25 ENVIL. L. 171, 184 (1995).
133. See Deltona Corp. v. United States, 657 F.2d 1184,
1192-93 (Ct. Cl. 1981); lentgen v. United States, 657 F.2d 1210,
1213-14 (Ct. Cl. 1981). cert.'dened, 455 U.S. 1017 (1982); Ciampitti
v. United States, 22 Cl. Ct. 310. 319 (1991).
134. Loveladies Harbourv. United States, 21 CI. Ct. 153
(1990), aff'd, 28 F.3d 1171, 1181 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
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denial was 12.5 acres and the original tract owned
by Loveladies was 250 acres, although much of this
had been developed and sold before they applied
for permits to fill the 12.5 acres of wetlands. 135
When the Loveladies applied for the development
permit, they. still owned a total of 57 4 of the origi-
nal acres, including the 12.5 acres in question.
13 6
"Even if the appropriate unit [for evaluating whether
there was a takingi was the 57 4 acres still owned by
Loveladies at the time of permit application, less
than twenty-five percent of the parcel was restrict-
ed."137 This diminution in value probably would not
have qualified the Loveladies for takings compensa-
tion based on Supreme Court precedent. 138 The
Court, however, only considered the lost economic
value of the 12.5 acre parcel. Since this amounted to
a 99 percent loss of value, the majority found a tak-
ing based on Justice Scalia's categorical imperative
from Lucas. 39
In Florida Rock Industries v. United States, the Court
"limited its inquiry to the approximately 98 acres of
the entire 1560-acre property that was the subject of
the Corps permit application for limestone mining,
even though the remainder of the site was eventu-
ally to be mined."1 40 Judge Plager, the same judge
who later wrote Loveladies, created a new compens-
able violation of the Takings Clause in "partial tak-
ing" of property through government wetlands regu-
lation. 141 The Lucas majority never decided this
issue because it incorrectly assumed a total depri-
vation of economic value in the land and called it a
categorical taking. 42 Judge Plager wrote in his opin-
ion that the Court was compelled to decide the
issue since it had been "much debated" after the
Lucas decision. 143
These two post-Lucas cases definitely extend-
ed the takings doctrine set forth in recent Supreme
Court decisions, but their radical new approach
was largely instigated by the open window of
opportunity found in footnote seven of Lucas.144
These decisions also represent a trend in constitu-




139. See. e.g., Loveladies, 28 F.3d at 1179-82; Chertok, supra
note 94, at 1174.
140. Chertok. supra note 94, at 1174.
141. See Flonda Rock Industnes v. United States, 18 F.3d
1560, 1570 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
142. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1019. Justices Kennedy, Blackmun,
Stevens and Souter did question the legitimacy of finding a
"total deprivation of economic value" in Lucas' property. Id. at
1032-33 (Kennedy, j., concurrng); id. at 1043-45 (Blackmun, j.,
dissenting); Id. at 1043 (Stevens, J.. dissenting); id. at 1077-78
tional jurisprudence toward recognizing more reg-
ulatory takings and awarding more compensation.
Although Loveladies and Florida Rock are federal
court decisions, it is foreseeable their new doc-
trine will spread into state court decisions if the
Supreme Court fails to clearly overrule their break
from precedence.
Finally, in the Supreme Court's most recent reg-
ulatory takings decision, Dolan v. City of Tigard,145 the
Court created a sequel to Nollan's essential nexus
test by applying a heightened level of scrutiny to
government actions involving land use regulation.
Dolan applied to the City of Tigard, Oregon for a
building permit to double her store-size and pave
more of her lot for parking. 46 The City Planning
Commission approved her permit with two restric-
tions, in order to protect the floodplain between her
property and an adjacent creek and compensate for
the likely increase in automobile traffic following
her store expansion. 47 The Commission required a
dedication to the city of 7000 square feet of her
property lying within the creek's floodplain for a
storm drainage system and an additional fifteen
square feet adjacent to the floodplain for a bicycle-
pedestrian pathway.
148
The majority opinion, authored by justice
Rehnquist, concluded that there was an essential
nexus between the legitimate state interests, pre-
venting flooding and reducing traffic congestion,
and the city's permit conditions. 149 After adopting
this essential nexus test from Nollan, the Court
went on to analyze the degree of connection
required between the impact of Dolan's future
land development and the regulations imposed
upon her.1 0 The Court defined the standard as
"rough proportionality," meaning that the City
must make a case specificdetermination that the
development restrictions relate both in nature
and extent to the impact of Dolan's land develop-
ment. 151 "Therefore, under Dolan, local planning
agencies must now show that permit conditions
(Souter, I., separate statement).
143. See Florida Rock, 18 F3d at 1568.
144. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1016.
145. 512 U.S. 374 (1994).
146. See id. at 379.
147. See Knsten P. Sosnosky, Note, Dolan v. City of Tigard:
A Sequel to Nollan's Essential Nexus Test for Regulatory Takings. 73 N.
C. L. REv. 1677, 1679 (1995).
148. See id.
149. -See Dolan, 512 U.S. at 387-88.
150. See id.
151. Seeidat388.
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imposed on planned developments are roughly pro-
portional to the projected impact of the develop-
ment."152 In applying its newest test, the Court found
that the City did not make an individualized deter-
mination of why Dolan should have to dedicate a
portion of her property to the City in order to protect
the public from flooding or traffic congestion.153 The
Court reasoned there were other ways for the City to
acccimplish its legitimate. ends without forfeiting
Dolan's right to exclude others from her property.
154
With respect to the bikepath, the Court found that
the City had not definitively demonstrated that traf-
fic congestion would be offset.
155
The dissent criticized the majority for placing
yet a "new constitutional hurdle in the path of [the
City's] conditions. 156 Justice Stevens argued that the
majority failed to consider the effect of the regula-
tion on Dolan's property rights as a whole and
instead looked to the effect on one strand of proper-
ty rights. 157 Further, the Court never acknowledged
the benefits that Dolan would gain, such as protec-
tion from flooding and an increase in passersby who
might be potential buyers. Justice Stevens was espe-
cially concerned about the consequences of apply-
ing such a burdensome test on state regulators. He
stated that any expansion of Nolin should be limit-
ed, and the Court should "venture beyond consider-
ations of a condition's nature or germaneness only if
the developer establishes that a concededly ger-
mane condition is so grossly disproportionate to the
proposed development's adverse effects that it man-
ifests motives other than land use regulation on the
part of the city."
5 8
Many critics, including Justice Stevens, argue
that placing the burden on local. government to
show that they have complied with the rough pro-
portionality test severely hampers the government's
ability to effectively regulate land development for
the benefit of the public. 5 9 "If the government can
demonstrate that the conditions it has imposed in a
land-use permit are rational, impartial and con-
ducive to fulfilling the aims of a valid land-use plan,
Sosnosky, supra note 147, at 1683.
See Dolan, 512 U.S. at 395.
See id.
See id.
Id. at 397 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
See id. at 398 (Stevens. J., dissenting).
Id. at 398 (Stevens. J., dissenting).
See id. at 402 (Stevens, I., dissenting).
Id. at 411 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
See id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Id. at 391; Julian R. Kossow, Dolan v. City of Tigard,
a strong presumptive validity should attach to those
conditions."160 Therefore, 'if a landowner wishes to
challenge the constitutionality of a regulation that
the government has demonstrated to be rational,
then she should have the burden of proof.1
61
Instead, under this new standard, the government
must demonstrate that the regulation is related
"both in nature and extent to the impact of the pro-
posed development." 162 While the majority views its
"rough proportionality" standard as a constitutional
check on the state's police power 63 in actuality it
will simply create inefficiency and difficulty for the
regulatory agency. Regarding this newest test for
constitutional analysis in the changing era of regu-
latory takings, Justice Stevens wrote:
In our changing world one thing is certain:
uncertainty will characterize predictions
about the impact of new urban develop-
ments on the risks of floods, earthquakes,
traffic congestion, or environmental harms.
Where there is doubt concerning the mag-
nitude of those impacts, the public interest
in averting them must outweigh the private
interest of the commercial entrepreneur.1
64
According to some scholars, this new era in reg-
ulatory takings law "conveyls] two unmistakable
points: the government has the burden of justifying
its regulation, and the Justification must be recon-
ciled with the common law of property"''165 Some-
even go so far to say that "no public harm is created,
by the landowner undertaking a common law use [of*
propertyl."'66 According to others, this trend exem-
plifies the danger of defining a Takings Clause test:
"what level of scrutiny applies to government
actions in the land use regulatory context."167 The
Court is going too far in these cases in applying
heightened scrutiny to government regulations and
forcing the state to jump through hoops, some
insurmountable, just to regulate land use for the
benefit of society.
Takings Law, and theSupreme Court: Throwing the Baby Out with
the Floodwater, 14 STAN. ENVTL. L. J. 215, 228 (1995) ("Distilled
to its essence, the new constitutional requirement of 'rough
proportionality' becomes an exercise in quantifying the
extent or degree of the connection between the imposed
condition and the anticipated impact of the project").
163. See Dolan. 512 U.S. at 391.
164. Id. at 411 (Stevens, J;, dissenting).
165. Douglas W. Kmiec, At Last, The Supreme Court
Solves The Takings Puzzle. 19 HARV. j. L. & PUB. POi'Y 147. 155
(1995).
166. Id.
167. Kossow. supra note 162. at 223.
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V. The Dual Effect On Environmental
Protection Legislation
If Lopez lives up to its potential, the Court has
given more power to the states to regulate under
the guise of federalism and Congressional power.
On another level, under Fifth Amendment takings
analysis, the federal judiciary actually usurps power
better left in the hands of maloritarian state legisla-
tive determination. The essence of the dilemma is
that both federal and state branches of government
could be unable to promulgate and maintain effec-
tive environmental regulations, such as isolated
wetlands regulations.
Already, legal scholars and other interested
parties are "plotting to 'Lopez' [environmental regu-
lationsl." 68 As a specific remedy to cases like Leslie
Salt, one scholar suggests courts rule "that neither
potential nor actual use by migratory birds allows
Congress to regulate isolated wetlands using the
commerce power."' 69 Even those with less radical
viewpoints about the consequences of Lopez foresee
a resurgence of commerce clause challenges.
"Wetland and similar environmental regulations are
particularly vulnerable."17 "It is not apparent, how-
ever whether the case ultimately will be ludged an
aberration or a watershed."'
7'
A common reassurance by those who call for an
extension of Lopez to federal environmental laws is
that "states and local governments can protect iso-
lated wetlands." 72 Indeed, many of these promoters
do not call for the wanton destruction of wetlands,
but find the proper regulating entity to be the state.
However, even if the proper regulating entity were
the state, its ability to adequately protect wetlands
is highly questionable given states' limited financial
resources. "IlIncreased compensation requirements
[under the Takings Clausel will produce less regula-
tion, which in turn will produce more environmen-
tal injuries."173 Although property-rights advocates
celebrated the victories in Nollan, Lucas and Dolan,
168. Joseph Calve, What Does Lopez Mean?, CONN. L. TRIB..
Aug, 14. 1995, at I (a political organization, the Texas Justice
Foundation plans to file suit against the Endangered Speaes Act).
169. Leman, supra note 69, at 1268.
170. Paul D. Kamenar. Reduced Business for the Commerce
Clause?; Sixty years of reading the Commerce Clause as infinitely elastic
snapped back with U.S. v. Lopez, THE RECORDER, May 15. 1995, at 8.
171. John P. Frantz, The Reemergence of the Commerce Clause as
a Limit on Federal Power United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624.
(1995), 19 HAgv. I. L. PUB. POCY 161, 167 (1995).
172. Leman, supra note 69. at 1271-72.
173. Blumm, supra note 132, at 180.
174. See Kossow. supra note 162, at 244.
they may have less to celebrate in the future when
regulatory agencies become paralyzed with effectu-
ation of land use and environmental regulations
and people realize that governments will either go
bankrupt under the current majority trend in takings
jurisprudence, implement new taxation programs to
fund "takings," or be forced to give up the invaluable
service of protecting our threatened environment.1
74
Due to concern over the potential increase in com-
pensation to be paid for regulatory takings, a
Philadelphia real estate developer wrote: "Wetlands
laws protect property values by keeping communi-
ties attractive and by buffering floods Also the
sheer cost of paying property owners for their
claims and the specter of continual litigation would
dramatically undermine our environmental laws."'
75
It is possible that Lopez will not be a conserva-
tive counterrevolution and will simply be used as a
definition of the outer limits to federal activism. 7 6
It is also possible that the new trend in takings
jurisprudence will be tempered by an opinion in the
next takings case for which the Supreme Court
grants certiorari. However, some effects will come of
these cases as it is likely the Court will not revert to
prior precedents immediately 'after swaying from
them.
VI. Proposal
The federal government has clearly taken the lead
in the regulatory field of environmental'protection. It
has established (and it enforces) national, uniform
standards for many environmental problems, includ-
ing the protection of isolated wetlands. Congress has
established such standards and programs, like the
Clean Water Act, in order to protect national resources
and prevent national disasters. States are free to devel-
op their own programs and standards as long as they
are consistent with and do not fall below the stan-
dards set by Congress. In fact, many environmental
statutes, including the Clean Water Act, encourage
175. Id. at 255 n. 183 (quoting Dan Gordon, In The Press:
Developer Attacks Takings, N.Y. TIMEs, Mar. 15, 1995).
176. See Merritt, supra note 61. at 750 ('The modest ambi-
tion proclaimed by the majority - to prune an excessive and
unnecessary piece of congressional meddling while leaving prior
Commerce Clause decisions untouched - insulates those two
pnnciples from reversal. Lopez will be distinguished, but it is
unlikely to be reversed.").
But see, Lopez, 514 U.S. at 614-15 (Souter, I., dissenting)
('Today's decision may be seen as only a misstep, its reasoning
and its suggestions not quite in gear with the prevailing stan-
dard, but hardly an epochal case. I would not argue otherwise,
but I would raise a caveat. Not every epochal case has come in
epochal trappings.").
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states to establish their own policies to handle unique
environmental problems within their borders. The
existing federal environmental regulations have many
downfalls, but the only assurance for safeguarding val-
ues and interests of proven national significance is
through federal stewardship.
While some may doubt the true national signif-
icance of intra-state isolated wetlands, scientific
findings and our increase in knowledge of ecosys-
tems demonstrate that our interdependent system
is affected by the destruction of such wetlands. 177
The effects transcend borders due to the important
roles these wetlands play in the survival of migrato-
ry bird populations, the survival of endangered
species, maintenance of a healthy watershed, pre-
vention of flooding, and encouraging recreation,
lust to name a few. Each of these effects extends
beyond the state in which the isolated wetland is
located. The impact is economic as well as ecologi-
cal. Therefore, it is critical that Congress has author-
ity to regulate national environmental concerns.
In order to avoid potential constriction of envi-
ronmental protection regulations stemming -from
such management there are several options available.
First, I would argue that Lopez was incorrectly decided-.
The majority's break from precedent is laid out in the
dissenting opinions of Justice Souter and Justice
Breyer. Theydemonstrated how the malority failed to
apply the well-established rational basis review for
congressional legislation. Justice Souter explained
that the existence of federal legislation implies a find-
ing by Congress that a particular activity substantial-
ly affects interstate commerce. 178 "The only question
is whether the legislative ludgment is within the
realm of reason."'79 Justice Breyer writes, "the [Gun-
Free School Zonesl statute falls well within the scope
of the commerce power as this Court has understood
that power over the last half-century."180 "[A] holding
that the particular statute falls within the commerce
power would not expand the scope of that Clause.
Rather, it simply would apply preexisting law to
changing economic circumstances. It would recognize
that, in today's economic world, gun-related violence
near the classroom makes a significant difference to
our economic, as well as our social, well-being."Si
The essential nexus between regulating guns in
school zones and a substantial effect on interstate
commerce is not an unreasonable, inferential argu-
177. See supra notes 19-28 and accompanying text.
178. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 613 (Souter, J., dissenting).
179. Id.
180. Id. at 615 (Breyer, I., dissenting).
181. Id. at 624-25 (Breyer, I., dissenting) (citations omit-
ment. Today, the effect on our nation of gun-related
violence in and around schools is a significant com-
mercial and human problem. 182 The Court should
have respected the rationality of the legislation
based on this finding in comport with commerce
power precedence.
Alternatively, if Lopez endures as a representa-
tion of an outer limit to the federal -commerce
power, isolated wetlands regulation can be distin-
guished from the Gun-Free School Zones Act in
order to survive a commerce clause challenge. First,
Congress and the regulatory agencies have made it
clear that they will regulate any wetlands which
could have a substantial effect on interstate com-
merce 83 In promulgating regulations, both'the EPA
and the Corps have listed specific examples consti-
tuting a "substantial effect" such as the presence of-
migratory birds on isolated wetlands, the presence
of interstate travelers, or prevention of flooding.
The nexus between the destruction of isolated
wetlands and the loss of these interstate benefits is
different from the nexus between guns in school
zones and a decrease in national economic produc-
tivity. The former does not require a piling of "infer-
ence upon inference," a criticism of the govern-
ment's nexus argument in Lopez.184 For instance,
destruction of an isolated wetland which provides
habitat to migratory birds will have a direct impact
on the birds' survival and, therefore, on any com-
mercial or economic benefit of the birds to other
states or interstate travelers. Although one
destroyed intra-state isolated wetland might simply
force the birds to migrate elsewhere, the cumulative
effect of wetland destruction would be devastating.
Since Lopez did not overrule Wickard v. Filburn, this
-cumulative approach to analyzing wetlands destruc-
tion (as an economic activity) is still constitutional-
ly valid.185 This type of argument is not as expansive
as the national productivity reasoning in Lopez
because the substantial effect on interstate com-
merce is clear without resorting to an inferential
argument. It also appears from the majority opinion
that an explicitly detailed congressional record of
why the regulation pertains to interstate commerce
will lend itself to more deferential review.186 So any
manipulation of the record to strengthen the gov-
ernment's argument will be beneficial.
It is important to consider that the Court does
182. See id. at 623 (Breyer, I., dissenting).
183. See supra notes 84-90 and accompanying text.
184. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567.
185. Id. at 557-58.
I86. See id. at 563.
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not want to interfere with the states' general police
power within their own borders. When states, acting
separately, face difficulty in protecting environmen-
tal interests, however, it is clear that extensive fed-
eral regulation is justified. 8 7 "A case could be made
that there is a relationship between the nation as a
whole and the natural heritage of the nation con-
sidered as a whole, that gives rise to a general inter-
est in our environment and resources that is not
lust the sum of the interests of the states."
188
However, if states take responsibility for pro-
tecting their own isolated wetlands without help
from the federal government, the Fifth
Amendment's Taking Clause should not present
such a heavy burden that it would stifle effective
government regulation. The new, strict takings tests
are an unreasonable break from precedent and
unjustifiable in the modern regulatory state where
traditional views about property rights and commu-
nity rights are evolving toward even greater Inter-
'connectedness and interdependency. justice
Stevens, in his Lucas dissent, emphasized how prop-
erty gets redefined as our society evolves. 89 "[Olur
ongoing self-education.produces changes in the
rights of property owners: New appreciation of the
significance of endangered species, importance of
wetlands, and the vulnerability of coastal lands
shapes our evolving understandings of property
rights." 90
"Long ago it was recognized that all property in
this country is held under the implied obligation
that the owner's use of it shall not be injurious to
the community, and the Takings Clause did not
transform that principle to one that requires com-
pensation whenever the State asserts its power to
enforce it."19i First, the Supreme Court's new doc-
trine that if a property-owner was not subject to a
certain limitation when she purchased the property
(the nuisance exception), there is no government
exception within a takings analysis, is ill-conceived.
Secondly, the categorical taking approach empha-
sized in Lucas, eliminates any balancing of the prop-
187. See Donald H. Regan, How To Think About the Federal
Commerce Power and Incidentally Rewrite United Slates v. Lopez, 94
MICH. L. REv. 554, 582 (1995).
188. Id. at 582.
189. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1069-70 (Stevens, J., dissent-
erty owner's interests with the government's inter-
est in protecting the community, and it creates
innumerable difficulties in consistently defining the
property interest at stake. Finally, the Nollan and
Dolan innovation of placing the burden of proof on
the government to demonstrate the regulation is
not only necessary to achieve a legitimate end but
roughly proportional to the impact created by the
property owner is unreasonable and not based on
solid constitutional precedent.
Even in applying the new tests, courts should
be able to avoid overburdensome regulatory takings
compensations by using the "nuisance at common
law" exception. "Nuisance determinations are both
.local and dynamic As the subtleties of local
ecology are better understood by modern science
and incorporated into local conceptions of harm,
the house built yesterday may not be the equivalent
of the house built today." 92 Similarly, in his dissent
in Lucas, Justice Blackmun explained that in order to
determine when there is a nuisance, courts must
look to whether a particular use is harmful. 193 He
then questioned why the majority trusts judges in
the 18th and 19th centuries to distinguish a harm
from a benefit, but not 20th century judges or legis-
lators.i94
A nuisance is defined by subjective interpreta-
tions of society. These definitions will not remain
static. Just as Justice Rehnquist gave the example of
building a nuclear plant on a fault line as something
that would be a nuisance at common law, so would
the destruction or impairment of isolated wetlands.
Building a nuclear plant on a fault line is a nuisance
because of our knowledge that if there was an earth-
quake, toxic material and radiation leaks would
cause significant environmental damage. Similarly,
destroying wetlands is a nuisance because of our
knowledge today that if we lose too many, we will
also endanger our health, our natural environment
and irreplaceable plants and animals.
191 Id. at 1039-40 (Blackmun, j.. dissenting).
192. Kmiec, supra note 165, at 153.
193. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1054-55.
194. See Id.
190. Id. (citations omitted).
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Z VII. Conclusion
We live in an ecologically interdependent world
where wetlands; whether isolated or adjacent, are
vital life support systems. The Supreme Court's shift
to limiting federal power under the Commerce
Clause, combined with its shift to create more com-
pensable rdgulatory takings under- the Fifth
Amendment, might unduly restrict appropriate pro-
tective mechanisms for these natural resources. It is
unnecessary to interpret the Constitution so restric-
tively and it runs counter to the regulatory state in
which we live. These trendsmust either be reversed
or limited in order for the government, whether
state or federal, to protect the environment in a way
the private sector alone has failed to do.
